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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhimeier:
Prior Restraint Doctrine Finds a Home
in America's Public Schools
In the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Community School
District,' the United States Supreme Court established that public2
school students retain first amendment rights while on the school
grounds.' The Tinker decision caused a flood of litigation in the
federal courts.4 The Student Press Law Center received over 500
reports of censorship battles among school newspaper editors and
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2. Neither Tinker nor Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988),
considers the first amendment rights of students in private schools. Consequently, this note
likewise addresses only public schools. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (concluding that "[i]n the
circumstances, our Constitution does not permit officials of the State to deny [the plaintiff's]
form of expression)(emphasis added); Kuhimeier, 108 S.Ct. at 567 (referring exclusively to
"[s]tudents in the public schools.. ."). It should be noted, however, that some commentators
contend that every school is a public institution. See generally Wright, The Constitution on
the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1035 (1969); Cohen, The Private-Public Legal Aspects
of Institutions of Higher Education, 45 DENVER L.J. 643 (1968). As a general rule, however,
the United States Constitution applies only to the relationship between the government and
individuals. Students enrolled in private schools, therefore, do not retain the same first
amendment rights as do their public school counterparts. Okamoto, Prior Restraint and the
Public High School Student Press: The Validity of Administrative Censorship of Student
Newspapers Under the Federal & California Constitutions, 20 LoYoLA L.A. L. REv. 1055,
1067 n.46. Indeed, courts have rejected the argument that private action becomes state action
when an otherwise private school receives substantial public funding. See Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 832 (1982) (holding that no state action existed despite the fact that 90-
99% of the budget of a private high school was publicly funded); Grossner v. Trustees of
Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 536, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding no state action existed
although public funds constituted 40-45% of the income of a private university). The courts
have also rejected the claim that private schools are state actors because they are performing
a public function, such as education. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842; Grossner, 287 F. Supp.
at 549.
3. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
4. See infra notes 73-85, 186-188 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial reaction
to the Tinker decision).
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school administrators in 1987. 5 In order to resolve these disputes,
the United States Supreme Court, in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,6 granted school authorities broad discretion to edit school
newspapers.7 In Kuhlmeier, the Court held that public school admin-
istrators may exercise editorial control over school-sponsored news-
papers when official actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical" concerns. 9
Part I of this note will discuss the legal background of the First
Amendment generally.' 0 Next, the development of first amendment
law pertaining to students' first amendment rights will be explored."
Part II will summarize the facts of the Kuhlmeier case and review
the decision of the Supreme Court.' 2 Finally, Part III of this note
will discuss the legal ramifications of the Kuhlmeier decision. 3
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to comprehend fully the nature of the first amendment
rights of high school students, one must explore the law governing
speech outside the confines of the school campus.
5. Seligmann & Namuth, A Limit on the Student Press, NEwswmK, January 25, 1988,
p. 60.
6. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
7. Seligmann & Namuth, supra note 5, at 60. See infra notes 121-125 and accompanying
text (discussing the holding of Kuhlmeier and the degree of discretion granted to school
authorities by the Kuhlmeier majority).
8. WEBSTER'S TnRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTONARY 1663 (1976) (defining pedagogic
or pedagogical to mean suiting, resembling, or pertaining to teachers or to education).
9. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 (1988). It should be noted
that Kuhimeier may not apply in California because the state legislature has specifically
dilineated student journalists' free press rights in section 48907 of the California Education
Code. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §48907 (West Supp. 1988). How Kuhlmeier will impact future
student press litigation in California is unclear. One commentator has suggested two potential
approaches to section 48907: applying a per se ban on prior restraint or applying a public
forum analysis on a case-by-case basis. Okamoto, supra note 2, at 1104-47. The per se rule
has been adopted by the Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District in California.
SeeLeeb v. DeLong, 198 Cal. App. 3d 47, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1988). In fact, Leeb suggests
that the Kuhimeier holding is not controlling in California. Id. at 54, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 497-
98. However, Leeb may be distinguished from Kuhlmeier because Leeb involved potentially
defamatory speech-not pedagogical concerns. Id. at 51, 58, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 495, 500-01.
Therefore, the Leeb court's mention of Kuhimeier may be dicta. More importantly, Leeb
assumed that section 48907 of the Education Code mandates the conclusion that school
newspapers are limited public forums, although the statute is apparently silent on the public
forum question. See id. at 57, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 500. The public forum issue is the centerpiece
of the Kuhlmeier opinion. See infra notes 112-119 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court's analysis of the public forum issue). See also infra note 175 (discussing other
relevant California law).
10. See infra notes 14-63 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 64-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 87-153 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 154-217 and accompanying text.
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A. Constitutional Restrictions on Freedom of Speech
The First Amendment declares: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or the press. . . . "'14 Despite the
absolute nature of the language of the First Amendment, some
limitations on free speech and press are permissible." For example,
defamatory speech 6 and incitement to illegal action 7 are not protected
by the First Amendment and may be punished subsequent to the
utterance of the speech. A prior restraint on speech is the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights.' While prior restraints have
been rejected throughout the last three centuries, 9 the United States
Supreme Court has refused to ban prior restraints completely.20 The
Court will permit a prior restraint only in extreme circumstances,
2'
14. U.S. CONsT., amend. I. The Supreme Court declared that "freedom of speech and
of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-
are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states." Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
15. See Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877
(1963) (discussing factors underlying a nonverbal interpretation of the free speech and free
press provisions of the first amendment and formulating a basic theory and specific doctrines
for first amendment law).
16. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (public figures
must show "actual malice" to recover damages for libel); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (private individual need not demonstrate actual malice to recover damages
for libel). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568 (1977) (outlining the elements of
defamation).
17. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that advocacy
inciting or promoting "imminent lawless action" is not protected by the first amendment and
may be punished).
18. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (voiding an injunction
against distribution of leaflets attacking a real estate broker for encouraging whites to move
from a neighborhood). On the doctrine of prior restraint, see generally Barnett, The Puzzle
of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539 (1977); Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint:
The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REv. 11 (1981); Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,
20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955); Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L. J. 409
(1983); Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory,
70 VA. L. REv. 53 (1984).
19. See Emerson, supra note 15, at 909-16 (discussing the history of prior restraint
doctrine).
20. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708, 716 (1931). If the command of the First
Amendment was absolute then any and all restraints on the press would be prohibited. See
generally J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTIrrONAL LAW 858, 865-67 (1986). The
Supreme Court has refused to adopt this absolutist position. See Near, 283 U.S. at 708, 716.
See also Nebraska Press Ass'n., 427 U.S. at 570 ("This court has frequently denied that First
Amendment rights are absolute and has consistently rejected the proposition that a prior
restraint can never be employed."); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726
(1971) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting prior restraints are permissable in very
limited circumstances); id. at 748 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (indicating that the First Amendment
is not absolute, but that clear constitutional limitations apply to prior restraint).
21. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. Chief Justice Hughes explained:
[T]he protection even as to prior restraint is not absolutely unlimited. But the
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such as obscene speech 2 or speech which threatens national security. 2
However, even in an area where speech is not protected, such as
obscene speech, the government must grant the speaker access to the
courts to challenge the restraint. 24 To ensure prompt judicial review
of the censorship program the government must initiate judicial
proceedings against those intending to express themselves. 25  Any
attempts by the government to invoke a prior restraint must overcome
a heavy presumption of invalidity,2 6 and the government carries a
heavy burden of justifying the imposition of such a restraint.2 1
Furthermore, any restraints imposed by the government before ju-
dicial review may last only for a specified brief period. 28 Strict
limitation has been recognized only in exceptional cases: "When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort
that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court
could regard them as protected by any constitutional right." . . . On similar grounds,
the primary requirements of decency may be enforced against obscene publications.
The security of community life may be protected against acts of violence and the
overthrow by force of orderly government.
Id. (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations and footnotes omitted)).
22. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483, 485 (1957) (holding that obscenity is
not constitutionally protected speech). See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973)
(holding that the first amendment does not protect "works which, taken as a whole, appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and
... do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value").
23. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam) (Pentagon
Papers case). In the Pentagon Papers case, the government sought to enjoin the New York
Times from publishing a top secret military policy statement involving the Vietnam War. Id.
at 714. The government maintained that release of the papers would jeopardize national
security, but the court found this argument unpersuasive. Id. at 717-18. Most of the justices
agreed that publication might be damaging to national interests, but argued that a prior
restraint cannot be imposed on publications that might prejudice the national interest. Id. at
725-26 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
24. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975) (overturning
the refusal of a municipality to rent an auditorium for production of the play Hair as an
unlawful prior restraint); Blount v. Rizzo, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971) (holding that postal
regulations designed to deny the use of the mails to commercial distributors of obscene
literature lacked adequate procedural safeguards against prior restraint); Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1965) (permitting limited prior restraint pending judicial evaluation of
allegedly obscene material).
25. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560; Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58.
26. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). As the Court has noted, the presumption of unconstitutionality of prior
restraint exists primarily because while the "threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication
'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Nebraska Press Ass'n v.
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (footnote omitted). For further analysis of the evils of prior
restraint, see Emerson, supra note 8, at 659; see also T. EMRSON, The System of Freedom
of Expression 506 (1970).
27. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
28. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 560 ("any restraint prior to judicial
review can be imposed only for a brief period"). See also New York Times Co., 403 U.S.
713; Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59 ("the exhibitor must be assured by statute or authorative
judicial construction, that the censor will, within a brief specified period, either issue a license
or go to court to restrain showing the film") ; Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 53,
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compliance with the above procedures i§ vital to guarantee that
constitutionally protected speech is not restricted. 29
The United States Supreme Court on two occasions has deviated
from the established policy pertaining to content regulation by carving
out exceptions to first amendment law cases involving minors. Ex-
pression by adults directed toward minors may be regulated even
though the same expression would be protected if aimed at adults. 0
In Ginsberg v. New York,3' the Court upheld a state statute banning
the sale of soft-core pornographic magazines to minors.12 The Court
held that the magazines by contemporary community standards were
not obscene for adults. 33 The Court found, however, that the interest
of the state in protecting the welfare of minors and in supporting
parental prerogatives to keep pornography from their children jus-
tified barring the sale of the magazines to minors. 34 Similarly, in
F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation,35 the Court upheld an administrative
decision of the Federal Communications Commission circumscribing
the broadcasting of an indecent comic monologue.36 The Court
justified the regulation, in part, because broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children. 37 Although the Court conceded that the mon-
70 (1963) (stating that a prior restraint system is tolerable only where it "assure[s] an almost
immediate judicial determination of the validity of the restraint.").
29. Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70. In Bantam Books, the actions of the review board,
whose purpose was to "educate the public concerning .. . [literature] manifestly tending to
the corruption of the youth" induced distributors to recall copies of the best selling novel
Peyton Place, preventing both children and adults from acquiring the award-winning novel.
Id. at 59.
30. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
31. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The statute at issue in Ginsberg followed the contemporary
definition of obscenity, but the statute evaluated speech in terms of suitability of the speech
for minors. Id. at 646. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24, 26 (1973) (defining obscenity);
Krislov, From Ginzburg to Ginsberg: The Unhurried Children's Hour Obscenity Litigation,
1968 Sup. CT. REV. 153.
32. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637 (1968).
33. Id at 634.
34. Id. at 639-41. The state has an independent interest in the well-being of its youth. Id.
at 640. Parents also have an independent right to raise their children as they see fit. Id at
639.
35. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See Note, Pacifica Foundation v. FCC: "Filthy Words," the
First Amendment and the Broadcast Media, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 164 (1978) (reviewing the
Supreme Court decision in Pacifica).
36. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750-51. The 12-minute monologue at issue was by comedian
George Carlin, entitled "Filthy Words," which had been recorded before a live audience in a
California theatre. Id. at 729.
37. Id. at 749-50. The court noted that each distinct medium of expression presents unique
First Amendment problems, id. at 748, and that broadcasting receives the most limited First
Amendment protection. The court pointed out that broadcasting is particularly pervasive
because it may invade the privacy of the home, "where the individual's right to be let alone
plainly outweights the First Amendment rights of the intruder." Id. The court further pointed
out that some children may not have understood the broadcast if it were in print form, but
that by hearing the monologue over the airwaves, children could easily enlarge their vocabulary.
Id. at 750.
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logue's language was not obscene, the Court found that language in
the monologue was indecent.38 The Court relied on Ginsberg for the
proposition that forms of offensive expression may be withheld from
minors without restricting the expression completely.39 Thus, Ginsberg
and Pacifica indirectly establish that the first amendment rights of
minors are not coextensive with the rights of adults.
40
Although prior restraints on speech are strictly proscribed with
limited exceptions, the government may establish reasonable time,
place and manner regulations on speech uttered on public property.
41
These regulations, such as parade permit requirements, cannot be
overbroad42 or so vague 43 that individuals lack clear guidance as to
what action is prohibited. 44 Rather, the regulation must be drawn
with narrow specificity.45 The degree of specificity required in the
regulation depends on the nature of the forum in which the expression
takes place.
46
Historically, regulations of expression on public property are per-
missible in varying degrees depending on the nature of the forum
where the speech is offered.4 7 In Hague v. CIO,48 the Supreme Court
recognized that city streets and parks had long been used for purposes
of assembling, exchanging thoughts among citizens, and discussing
public issues. 49 The Supreme Court established that speech made on
public property is constitutionally protected.5 0
38. Id. at 727, 729, 735. See id. at 751-55 (appendix to the opinion of the court containing
a verbatim transcript of the monologue).
39. Id. at 749.
40. Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 57-58 (4th Cir. 1971); Koppell v. Levine, 347 F.
Supp. 456, 458-59 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57
TEx. L. REv. 321, 334-35 (1979); Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press,
83 MICH. L. REv. 625, 632 n.41 (1984) (discussing the difference between the first amendment
rights of adults and minors).
41. See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 26, at 298-310 (discussing time, place and
manner restrictions on speech).
42. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969) (holding that an
ordinance which confered upon the city commissioner broad discretion to prohibit any parade,
procession, or demonstration, was void because the prior restraint of a license must be narrow,
objective, and provide definite standards to guide the licensing authority); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940) (holding a statute prohibiting all picketing facially void
since the statute banned peaceful picketing protected by the first amendment).
43. See, e.g., Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
44. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (overturning the conviction of an individual
for violating a state flag-misuse statute because the statute was vague).
45. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) (citing Cantwell v. Conneticut, 310 U.S.
296, 311 (1940)).
46. Okamoto, supra note 2, at 1066 n.41 (discussing the forum theory and the concom-
mitant degree of specificity required for statutes applying to the different types of forums).
47. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
48. 307 U.S. 496 (1939). C
49. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.
50. See generally Gorlick, Right to a Forum, 71 DICK. L. Rv. 273 (1967) (analyzing the
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In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Asso-
ciation," the Supreme Court established three classes of forums: the
traditional public forum, the limited or nontraditional public forum,
and the nonpublic forum. 2 Examples of the traditional public forum
are streets, parks and other similarly situated public properties.53 In
public forums the government may not prohibit all speech.5 4 Any
content-based regulation on speech must serve a compelling state
interest and must be narrowly drawn to achieve that interest in order
to be enforced. s5 The state may also enforce content-neutral regula-
tions restricting the time, place and manner of speech in these public
forums so long as the regulations are narrowly tailored to serve a
significant state interest and leave open sufficient alternative channels
of communication.
56
state of authority regarding the creation of a public forum); Homing, The First Amendment
Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DuKE L.J. 931 (discussing the evolution of the public forum
concept, the logic behind the doctrine, and the scope of the right of access to a pubic forum);
Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (discussing
early developments in public forum cases and the implications of Cox v. Louisiana); Comment,
The Public School as Public Forum, 54 TEx. L. REv. 90 (1975) (discussing public forum
analysis as the analysis pertains to students' first amendment rights).
51. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
52. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
53. Id. at 45. See also Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921,
925 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975) (holding that an air terminal is public
property which resembles public thoroughfares and is, therefore, an area where individuals
possess a constitutionally protected right to communicate); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479
F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that an air terminal is public property subject- only
to limitations on free speech that are narrowly drawn and serve a compelling state interest);
Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 85 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 940 (1968) (holding that a bus terminal closely resembles city streets and therefore an
ordinance prohibiting exercise of first amendment rights in the terminal is void).
54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
55. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
56. Id. (citing United States Postal Ser. v. Council of Greenburgh Civil Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981) (holding that a mailbox is not a public forum); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980) (invalidating a New York Public Service
Commission order that precluded Edison from circulating bill inserts that discussed controversial
issues pertaining to nuclear power); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972)
(holding that an anti-picketing ordinance was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Cantwell v. Conneticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940) (overturning a
common law breach of peace conviction of a Jehovah's Witness member who was soliciting
contributions door-to-door); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939) (invalidating a litter
ordinance which required persons who distributed leaflets, pamphlets, and the like, to get
prior approval from the police before the leaflets, etc., could be disseminated on city streets)).
Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech, such as parade permit ordinances and
noise statutes, need only be reasonable. When a regulation is based on the content of speech,
however, state action must be scrutinized more carefully to prevent viewpoint discrimination.
Consol. Edison Co., 447 U.S. 536.
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Nontraditional or limited public forums exist where the state has
designated a public place for expressive activity.17 The existence of a
limited public forum is a factual question resolved on a case-by-case
basis. For example, a school auditorium is designated a public forum
when individuals use the auditorium for public meetings s8 A state is
not required to retain property as a limited public forum indefinitely. 9
But, as long as the forum remains open to the public, the forum
must be governed by the same standards applicable to the traditional
public forum.60
On the other hand, public expression is judged by different criteria
when speech is delivered on public property that is not by tradition
or designation a public forum.61 Nonpublic forums are reserved for
their intended purposes, communicative or otherwise. 62 For example,
jails and military bases are not public forums, but rather public
properties that are reserved for a specific purpose. 6 Restrictions on
expression in nonpublic forums must only be reasonable and not
amount to viewpoint discrimination in order to be enforced. 64
57. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d
536, 547, 171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946) (finding that state law designated public school grounds
and, therefore, school premises were public forums); Goodhardt, Freedom of Speech and
Freedom of Press, 1964 WAsH. U.L.Q. 248, 257 (discussing the public forum issue).
58. See Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 546, 171 P.2d 885,
891-92 (1946) (holding that denying the San Diego Civil Liberty Committee, an affiliate of the
American Civil Liberties Union, access to a school auditorium, which was deemed a public
forum, because the S.D.C.L.C. would not sign an affidavit stating that the organization did
not advocate overthrow of the government, denied the S.D.C.L.C. the right of free speech
and assembly). See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 (1981) (holding that the site
used for university meeting facilities was public forum); City of Madison Joint School Dist.
v. Wisconsin Emp. Rel. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (holding that the site used for school
board meeting was a public forum).
59. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
60. Id. Designation of public property as a public forum does not preclude adoption of
regulations aimed at safeguarding the primary function of the property from interference by
the speech on the premises. United States Postal Ser. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns.,
453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) (upholding the decision
of a military commander disallowing certain presidential candidates the right to speak on a
military base); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (upholding the trespass conviction
of demonstrators who were protesting upon the premises of a county jail).
61. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)
(prison officials may exercise discretion to limit prisoners' speech rights because of a need for
discipline); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) (military commander may exercise
discretion to prohibit a presidential candidate from speaking on the base because of security
needs); Persons for Free Speech at SAC v. United States Air Force, 675 F.2d 1010, 1028
(1982) (military commander may exercise discretion to prohibit nuclear weapons protestors
from speaking on base because of need for security), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (1982).
64. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Regulations may not supress speech simply because public
authorities oppose the views of the speaker. Id.
402
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B. Students' First Amendment Rights
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
65
the Supreme Court held that the school violated the first amendment
rights of three students when they suspended the students for wearing
black armbands at school in protest of the Vietnam War.66 In the
Court's opinion, the armbands neither disrupted school functions nor
invaded the rights of others.67 The Court ruled that the speech must
actually disrupt the orderly atmosphere of the educational process,
or invade the rights of other individuals, to punish student expres-
sion .68
The majority declared that students on campus possess first amend-
ment rights. 69 The majority feared that state-operated schools would
resemble totalitarian states where students would receive only infor-
mation that the school opted to communicate if students were stripped
of their first amendment rights.
70
Nevertheless, the first amendment rights of students must be eval-
uated in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment. 7' Tinker loosely defined students' first amendment rights as
less than adults, but nonetheless worthy of respect and significant
protection.
72
The Tinker decision triggered a flood of litigation in the federal
courts by unequivocally stating that students possess first amendment
rights.73 Much of the litigation addressed the first amendment rights
65. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
66. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. The students wore armbands to school to protest the Vietnam
War despite having knowledge of a school policy forbidding such action. Id.
67. Id. See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the "invasion of rights"
prong of the Tinker test).
68. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. The test adopted by the Tinker court was articulated in
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966). In Burnside, the Fifth Circuit held that
the wearing of "freedom buttons" inscribed with the wording "One Man One Vote," could
not be prohibited absent a showing that school activities were disrupted or that students' rights
were invaded by wearing the buttons. Id. See also Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of
Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (companion case of Burnside).
69. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
70. Id. at 511.
71. Id. at 511.
72. Huffman & Trauth, High School Students' Publication Rights and Prior Restraint,
10 J. L. & EDUC. 485, 486 (1981) (discussing the various prior restraint cases involving student
speech in the post-Tinker era).
73. Most of these cases involve underground newspapers and symbolic speech. See infra
notes 186-205 (discussing content restrictions on non-school-sponsored student expression after
Kuhlmeier).
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of students who published high school newspapers. 74 Because the
Supreme Court repeatedly denied certiorari in these cases, 7 substan-
tial differences of opinion developed both within and among the
federal courts of appeal regarding when school officials could per-
missibly censor school newspapers 76 and other student expression.
77
A number of cases involving school-sponsored newspapers disal-
lowed censorship by high school administrators as a violation of the
first amendment rights of the students. 78 In three cases, the federal
courts found that the school newspaper was not part of the school
curriculum, concluding that the paper was not subject to curriculum
control in the same manner as an English class. 79 Treating the
curriculum determination as an issue of fact, these courts analyzed
the newspaper to determine whether the newspaper was a forum for
student expression or an extension of the regular school curriculum.,
Courts that found a newspaper to be a public forum for student
expression have applied the Tinker disruption test to determine
74. See generally Abbott, The Student Press: Some First Impressions, 16 WAYNE L. REv.
1 (1969) (discussing the implications of the Tinker decision).
75. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1081 (1980); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
925 (1978); Sullivan v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1032 (1973); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
76. See Huffman & Trauth, supra note 71 at 486-504 (discussing the split of authority
within the federal courts regarding school newspapers); Comment, Tinker's Legacy: Freedom
of the Press in Public High Schools, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 387, 405-418 (1979) (analyzing the
major legal trends in the federal circuit courts regarding school newspapers).
77. See infra notes 186-205 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of
Kuhlmeier on the various positions articulated by the federal circuit courts on the issue of
non-school-sponsored student expression).
78. See e.g., Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va. 1977),
aff'd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y. 1974),
aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
79. Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 734; Bayer 383 F. Supp. at 1166; Zucker 299 F. Supp. at
102. See also San Diego Comm. v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that an off-campus non-profit organization was denied first amendment rights when
school officials precluded them from advertising in a high school newspaper which the court
classified as a limited public forum); Lee v. Board of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01
(Wv.D. Wis. 1969) (state college newspaper deemed a public forum for student expression),
aff'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
80. See Gambino, 429 F. Supp. at 735 (holding that the student newspaper is not a part
of the school curriculum despite the fact that the school offered a journalism course and paid
most of the expenses of the newspaper); Zucker, 299 F. Supp. at 103-04 (holding that the
student newspaper is a forum for student expression despite a school policy limiting articles
to school-related topics). See also Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Education
Public Forum, 5 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 278 (1970) (discussing the implications of Tinker
on-the content and vehicle of student protests, and the high school as an educational public
forum); Note, Religious Expression in the Public School Forum, 72 GEo. L.J. 135, 140-49
(1983) (discussing when a public school has created a public forum for student expression,
and the implications of creating such a forum).
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whether editorial control by school officials was constitutional. 8'
Not all courts have found that high school newspaper censorship
violates the First Amendment. In two cases courts 2 have invoked
the second prong of Tinker and found the censoring of school
newspapers by school officials reasonable to prevent the invasion of
other students' rights. 83 In Trachtman v. Anker, school authorities
feared that a school newspaper survey regarding the sexual attitudes
'and practices of students would invade students' rights by subjecting
the students to psychological pressure that might cause emotional
harm. 84 Based on conflicting psychological testimony, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeal found that the concern of school officials
had a reasonable basis and upheld the decision of school adminis-
trators not to distribute the survey. 85 Similarly, in Frasca v. Andrews,
the District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld the
refusal of a principal to distribute an issue of the school newspaper
because the issue contained potentially libelous statements. 86
The conflicting results and general confusion surrounding litigation
involving school officials and high school newspaper staff members
set the stage for a decision by the Supreme Court. 87 In Hazelwood
81. Bayer, 383 F. Supp. at 1165 (concluding censorship violated students' first amendment
rights).
82. Trachtman, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Frasca v.
Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
83. Trachiman, 563 F.2d at 516; Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1052. See generally, Diamond,
Interference With the Rights of Others: Authority to Restrict Students' First Amendment
Rights, 8 J. L. & EDUC. 347 (1979) (discussing the invasion of rights prong of the Tinker
test). The Kuhlmeier court noted that the invasion of rights prong of the Tinker test was not
at issue in that case. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 570-71, n.5 (1988).
84. Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 516.
85. Id. at 517.
86. Frasca, 463 F. Supp. at 1052. The court followed the Trachtman Court's logic, but
narrowed the analysis of the Tractman decision by focusing on whether a letter printed in the
school newspaper was libelous. Given the seriousness of the allegations leveled against the
student who was the subject of the letter, the Court found that the principal had a reasonable
basis for his fears. Id. Frasca also represents the only federal court decision to uphold the
censoring of a school newspaper by school authorities on the grounds that the orderly
atmosphere of the education environment would be disrupted by distribution of an edition of
a school newspaper. Id. at 1051.
In Frasca, a letter to the editor of the school newspaper from the lacrosse team threatened
the newspaper staff with physical violence. The newspaper responded with a letter chastising
the lacrosse team for the harsh rhetoric of the letter that the team sent to the newspaper. Id.
at 1046. The decision of the principal not to distribute the paper that contained both of these
letters was upheld by the Court as reasonable because of the potential for conflict between
the two warring factions of the student body. Id. at 1052.
87. See Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the
Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HAsTINos CoNsT. L. Q. 1 (1984)
(reviewing competing constitutional principles in public education, and developing a new
analytical framework for resolving conflicts between the first amendment rights of public
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School District v. Kuhlmeier, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the
conflict between the federal courts.
II. THE CASE
A. The Facts
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,88 three former staff
members of the Hazelwood East High school newspaper contended
that school officials violated their first amendment rights by deleting
two pages from an issue of the school newspaper. 89 The adviser of
the newspaper submitted the page proofs of the upcoming issue to
the principal for review pursuant to school practice. 90 The principal
objected to two articles. 9' One article described the pregnancy expe-
riences of three high school students and contained references to
sexual activity and birth control. 92 The second article discussed the
impact of divorce on students at the high school. 93 The principal
found the subject matter to be inappropriate for some of the younger
students and feared that the unnamed subjects of the pregnancy
article would be identified from the texts.94 In addition, the principal
felt that the parents of a named student in the divorce article should
have been given the right to respond in the newspaper. 9 The principal
ordered the adviser to delete the two pages on which the articles
school students and the right of the state to control education, using Bd. of Educ. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982) as a guide). Compare Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools:
The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 477 (1981)(arguing for substantial
judicial deference to local educators in cases involving students' first amendment rights) with
Note-The High School Press, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 625 (1984) (concluding that prior restraints
on the high school press should be strictly proscribed and that procedural safeguards should
be implemented by school officials to protect students' first amendment rights); Comment,
supra note 61 (arguing generally for greater first amendment freedoms for the high school
press) and Note, Prior Restraints in Public High Schools, 82 YALE L.J. 1325 (1973) (concluding
that the Seventh Circuit position that prior restraints on student expression are per se invalid
is the superior view).
88. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).





94. Id. at 565-66.
95. Id. at 566. At the time the principal reviewed the article, the name of the student
was used in the divorce article. The name of the student was later deleted by the adviser,
unbeknown to the principal. Id.
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appeared. 96 The Board of Education supported the principal's deci-
sion.
97
The students brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Missouri, seeking a declaration that the
principal violated their first amendment rights, injunctive relief, and
monetary damages. 9 The district court held that no violation of the
students' first amendment rights occurred, and denied all relief. 99 The
Court of Appeal for the Eighth Circuit reversed.' ° The Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal.'0'
B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice White,'0 2 the Supreme Court held
that educators do not infringe students' first amendment rights when
exercising editorial control over student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities if the actions of educators are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' 0 3 In so holding, the Court con-
cluded that the two prong Tinker test' 4 was inappropriate for deter-
mining when a school may censor school-sponsored student
expression.' 5 The Court noted that while students in public schools
retain first amendment rights while on campus, ,06 the first amendment
rights of students in the public schools are not equivalent to the
rights of adults.'0 7 The first amendment rights of students, therefore,
must be examined in the context of the unique characteristics of the
96. Id. See also id. at 566 n.1 (noting the content of the other articles that were on the
two pages that the principal deleted from the issue of the newspaper).
97. Id. at 565.
98. Id. at 566.
99. Id. at 566. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (D.C. Mo.
1985).
100. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986).
101. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. 562, 567 (1988).
102. The opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor,
and Scalia. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined. Id. at 565.
103. Id. at 571.
104. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
105. Kuhlmeler, 108 S. Ct. at 570. The Court mentioned only school newspapers and
drama productions as examples of school-sponsored student expressive activities. Id. at 569.
106. Id. at 567 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
107. Id. (quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 3159,
3164 (1986)).
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school environment. 0 s With these principles in mind, the Court
analyzed two main issues. First, the Court determined whether the
school newspaper was a public forum.1°9 Second, the Court deter-
mined the appropriate standard of review for school-sponsored stu-
dent expression." 0
1. No Public Forum
The Kuhlmeier Court concluded that the school newspaper at issue
was not a public forum for purposes of first amendment protection."'
The Court distinguished public schools from streets, parks, and other
traditional public forums." 2 The Court held that school facilities,
such as school newspapers, are public forums only if authorities by
policy or practice indiscriminately open those facilities to the general
public or some segment of the public, such as student organizations'
In deciding whether the school newspaper was a public forum, the
Kuhlmeier Court carefully scrutinized the Hazelwood School Board
Policy regarding school newspapers." 4 The Court found the following
108. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). The majority also cited New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 341-43 (1985). T.L.O. involved the rights of students who had been subjected
to search and seizure on public school grounds by a school administrator. Id. at 328. The
Court held that the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment did not apply to students
who were searched by school officials, and that the reasonableness of the search is dependent
on the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 340-41.
109. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567-69. See infra notes 109-117 and accompanying text
(discussing the analysis of the public forum issue in Kulhmeier).
110. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569-71. See infra notes 118-129 and accompanying text
(discussing the standard of review adopted by the court in Kuhlmeier).
111. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 569.
112. Id. at 567-68. The Supreme Court, in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), declared
that streets and parks "have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions." Id. at 515. The Supreme Court, in Kuhlmeier,
found that "schools do not possess all of the attributes of streets, parks, and other traditional
public forums. . ." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 108 S.Ct. 562, 567 (1988).
113. Id. at 568. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47
(1983) (discussing whether the internal mail system of a school had been opened-up to the
general public).
114. Id. at 568-69. The policy, entitled "School Sponsored Publications," provided as
follows:
"Students who are not in the publications classes may submit materials for consid-
eration according to the following conditions:
a. All material must be signed.
b. The material will be evaluated by an editorial review board of students from
the publications classes.
c. A faculty-student review board composed of the principal, publications teacher,
two other classroom teachers and two publications students will evaluate the recom-
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facts significant: (1) the adopted curriculum of the school included
the school newspaper; (2) a faculty adviser taught an advanced
journalism class that was required for all newspaper staff members;
(3) the curriculum guide described the advanced journalism class as
a laboratory environment for students to apply their knowledge and
skills acquired in the basic journalism class; and (4) students received
grades and credit for their performance." 5 The Court also found that
the practice of school officials demonstrated a lack of intent to create
a public forum.'1 6 The Supreme Court relied on the district court's
findings that the adviser to the newspaper exercised substantial con-
trol over the paper,"17 and that the principal regularly reviewed the
page proofs before publication." s The Court, therefore, found no
clear intent by the school to create a public forum." 9
2. Standard of Review
The majority next articulated the appropriate standard of review
to be applied in determining when educators may permissibly censor
school-sponsored student expression. The Kuhlmeier Court created a
mendations of the student editorial board. Their decision will be final.
No material shall be considered suitable for publications in student publications that
is commercial, obscene, libelous, defaming to character, advocating racial or religious
prejudice, or contributing to the interruption of the educational process. School
sponsored student publications will not restrict free expression or diverse viewpoints
within the rules of responsible journalism. School sponsored publications are devel-
oped within the adopted curriculum and its educational implications and regular
classroom activities.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1455-56 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
115. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. 562, 568 (1988).
116. Id. at 569.
117. Id. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1454 (D.C. Mo.
1985) (finding of fact no. six-detailing the authority of the adviser to the newspaper).
118. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 568.
119. Id. at 569 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788,
802 (1985)). The Court of Appeals, however, found that a public forum had been created.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371-74 (8th Cir. 1986). The Court of
Appeals, among other things, relied heavily on a "Statement of Policy" printed in the
September 24, 1982, issue of the newspaper. Id. at 1372 n.3. The "Statement of Policy" noted
in pertinent part: "Spectrum, as a student press publication, accepts all rights implied by the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution which states that: 'Congress shall make
no law restricting. . .or abridging the freedom of speech or the press. . . .' That this right
extends to high school students was clarified in the Tinker v. Des Moines Community School
District case in 1969." Id. (ellipses in original). The Court of Appeals also quoted extensively
from the textbook used in the advanced journalism class, Id. at 1373 n.4. The textbook
reiterated Tinker in part, and also noted: "Student press has essentially the same rights and
responsibilities as the mass media." Id. The Supreme Court found that the evidence relied
upon by the Court of Appeals was "equivocal at best." Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 568.
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critical distinction between speech that occurs incidently on the school
grounds, and school-sponsored student expression. 20 The court dis-
tinguished Tinker from the present case because Tinker involved
happenstance political expression, whereas Kuhlmeier involved school-
sponsored student expression.' 2' The Court held that school officials
need not demonstrate that school-sponsored student expression ma-
terially interferes with, or substantially disrupts, everyday school
functions as was previously required by Tinker. 22 Rather, school
officials need show only that their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.' 23 The Court provided educators with
a lengthy list of potential justifications for censoring school-sponsored
student expression. 2 4 For example, school officials may act in order
to guarantee class lessons are learned and to prevent exposure of
immature students to materials inappropriate to their maturity level. 12 1
Furthermore, the school has a right to disassociate itself from any
speech that is disruptive of school activities, grammatically unsound,
poorly written, or inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, unsuitable for immature audiences, perceived to
advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise
inconsistent with the values of a civilized society, or politically non-
neutral articles.12 6 The Court concluded that educators may not censor
school-sponsored speech only when the decision of school authorities
has no valid educational purpose. 2 7
Consequently, the majority concluded that the principal's actions
were reasonable under the circumstances. The majority pointed out
that identification of the unnamed girls in the pregnancy article was
120. Id. at 569. The majority cited no precedent for this distinction. See id. The distinction
created by the Court undoubtedly derived from the District Court's division of prior case law
into two categories, speech outside of official school programs and school sponsored expression.
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp 1450, 1462-65 (D.C. Mo. 1985).
121. Kuhimeier, 108 S.Ct. at 569. The Court characterized the student speech involved in
Tinker as "personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises." Id.
122. Id. at 570. See supra notes 67 and accompanying text (discussing the two prong test
of Tinker).
123. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 571. The Court thus rejected the "substantial and reasonable
basis- test employed by various lower courts., See, e.g., Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp.
1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y. 1978). This "reasonably related" test, or as it is sometimes phrased,
the "rational basis" test, is the common test employed by the court in analyzing economic
and social legislation under the due process clause and equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
124. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 570.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 570.
127. Id. at 571.
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a legitimate concern' 28 and that the frank discussion of the girls' sex
lives and birth control experiences was arguably inappropriate for
fourteen-year-old freshman. 129 The majority also reasoned that the
principal's decision to give the parent criticized in the divorce article
an opportunity to respond was not unreasonable. 30 Finally, the Court
concluded that the decision to edit the full pages containing the two
articles at issue, rather than just the two articles, was reasonable in
light of the particular circumstances of the case.1
3 1
C. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brennan, 132 forcefully
disagreed with the majority opinion. First, the dissent argued that
the school newspaper was a public forum for student expression.
133
The dissent emphasized that the school board policy prohibited school
officials from restricting free expression or diverse viewpoints within
the rules of responsible journalism. 34 The dissent also noted that a
statement of policy, published in the newspaper at the beginning of
the school year, indicated that the student press retained all rights
implied by the First Amendment. 35 The dissent therefore concluded
that censorship by school officials clearly violated the first amend-
ment rights of the students. 36
Second, Justice Brennan was concerned with the failure of the
majority to apply the test articulated in Tinker to the facts of the
case. 3 7 Justice Brennan argued that Tinker properly struck the bal-
128. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
129. Id. at 571-72.
130. Id. at 572.
131. Id. The principal believed that the changes in the article could not be made if the
issue of the newspaper was to go to press in time to be distributed before the school year
ended. Id. at 566.
132. See supra note 101 (giving the breakdown of the votes in Kuhlmeier).
133. See supra note 141 (discussing in part the public forum analysis of the Court of
Appeals). Justice Brennan noted: "Spectrum 'was not just a class exercise in which students
learned to prepare papers and hone writing skills, it was a... forum established to give students
an opportunity to express their views while gaining an appreciation of their rights and
responsibilities under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution ... ' Kuhlmeier,
108 S.Ct. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795
F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir. 1986)).
134. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 573. See supra note 114 (providing the language of the school
board policy regarding school-sponsored newspapers).
135. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573. See supra note 119 (providing the full text of the
statement of policy).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 573-80.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
ance between students' first amendment rights and the efficient
functioning of public schools. 3 8 While recognizing the need to defer
to local school authorities, the dissent noted that historically judicial
intervention has been necessary to protect students' rights.' 39 In the
dissent's view, deference to school officials, to the degree afforded
by the majority opinion, would seriously impair first amendment
rights. 140 The dissent further contended that the dichotomy between
happenstance speech and school-sponsored expression, articulated by
the majority, was not only without precedential support, 4' but also
actually contrary to precedent.
4 2
The dissent next criticized the majority's justifications for aban-
doning the Tinker test. "43 The dissent subdivided the court's reasons
for affording school officials greater control over school-sponsored
speech into three areas; (1) the power of public educators to set
curriculum; (2) the interest of authorities in protecting immature
audiences from sensitive viewpoints; and (3) the right of the school
to disassociate itself from school-sponsored expression to which the
school objected.' 44 According to the dissent, the Tinker safeguards
138. Id. at 575.
139. Id. at 574 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. (1987) (striking down a state statute
banning the teaching of evolution absent instruction on "creation science"); Board of Educ.
v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (invalidating school board removal of books from the school
library when motivated by mere disapproval with the views the books express); Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968) (striking down state statute which prohibited teaching
Darwinian theory of evolution); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943) (state may not compel students to salute the flag); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 403 (1923) (state law banning the teaching of foreign language in public and private
schools unconstitutional)).
140. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 574. Justice Brennan stated:
If mere incompatibility with the school's pedagogical message were a constitutionally
sufficient justification for the suppression of student speech, school officials could
censor each of the foregoing hypotheticals [e.g. the student who responds to a
history teacher's question by stating "socialism is good"), converting our public
schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism" that "strangle free mind at its source."
Id. (citations omitted).
141. Id. at 571. On this point the dissent argued that the Tinker decision did not articulate
any discernable distinction between personal expression and school-sponsored speech. Id.
142. Id. The dissent pointed out that Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986), involved school-sponsored speech, but faithfully applied Tinker to the
facts of that case. The dissent also noted that two university speech cases similarly failed to
draw a line between happenstance and school-sponsored speech. Id. But see Hazelwood School
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 570 nn.3 & 4 (distinguishing both university speech cases
and Fraser). See also Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1464 (D.C.
Mo. 1985) (discussing Fraser after it was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but
before the case was heard by the Supreme Court).
143. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. at 576-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 576. None of the excuses offered by the majority supported the distinction
between happenstance and school-sponsored expression. Id.
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adequately addressed any concern over curriculum and the learning
process as a whole, including poor grammar, writing, or research.1
45
Moreover, the dissent asserted that censorship designed to shield
audiences or disassociate the sponsor serves no legitimate curricular
purpose. 46 The dissent found the efforts of the majority to justify
shielding audiences and disassociating the sponsor from objectionable
material, on the grounds that these were legitimate curricular con-
cerns, 147 unpersuasive at best.
4
Most of all, the dissent opposed any deviation from Tinker in
order to shield impressionable students from potentially sensitive
topics or unacceptable social viewpoints. 149 Although educators have
a mandate to inculcate values, the dissent reasoned that officials may
not exercise value-oriented mind control or act as -'thought police. "'
5
0
The dissent found potential topic sensitivity to be a "vaporous non-
standard" that would enable school authorities to disguise viewpoint
discrimination. 151
The dissent conceded that the right of a school to disassociate
itself from certain objectionable student speech may justify distin-
guishing happenstance expression from school-sponsored speech. 52
Nevertheless, the dissent argued that given the imposition on fun-
damental first amendment rights that prior restraint entails, a less
restrictive alternative to censorship was required. ' The dissent of-
fered two alternatives, such as disclaimers in newspapers or official
rebuttals by the administration. 54 The dissent concluded that the
145. Id. The dissent noted that the educator may, under Tinker, constitutionally censor
poor grammar, writing, or research, because to reward this kind of expression would interfere
with the curricular purpose of the school newspaper. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The majority argued that Principal Reynolds was giving the students a lesson in
legal, moral, and ethical restrictions imposed upon journalism. Id.
148. Id. at 577. The dissent stated:
[T]he principal never consulted the students before censoring their work... Further,
he explained the deletions in only the broadest of generalities .... [T]he court's
supposition that the principal intended (or the protestors understood) those gener-
alities as a lesson on the nuances of journalistic responsibility is utterly incredible.
If he did, a fact neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, the
lesson was lost on all but the psychic Spectrum staffer.
Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Justice Brennan thought the right of school officials to shield students from
potentially objectionable topics was particularly dangerous. He further contended: "Even in
its capacity as educator the state may not assume an Orwellian 'guardianship of the public
mind."' Id.
151. Id. at 578.
152. Id. at 579.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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majority approves of censorship by sanctioning the conduct of the
principal and labelling the conduct reasonable under the circum-
stances.155
III. RAMIFICATIONS
The mandate for substantial deference to the authority of local
educators involving school-sponsored newspapers by the court in
Kuhlmeier5 6 compels an analysis of the first amendment rights of
students after Kuhlmeier. Read most narrowly, Kuhlmeier represents
merely a conclusion that the Hazelwood East High School newspaper
is not a public forum. Hence, the newspaper is subject to prior
restraint by school officials.157 Read more broadly, Kuhlmeier signifies
a trend toward blanket deference by the Supreme Court to the
decisions of local school authorities.'58 Not only will the Kuhlmeier
decision affect high school newspapers, but also may have ramifi-
cation that affect other school-sponsored student expressive activities,
student expression that is not school-sanctioned, and the public
college and university press.
A. The High School Press
The Kuhlmeier decision may stand for the basic proposition that
public school officials have the same right to exercise editorial control
over high school newspapers as newspaper publishers have over
155. Id. Brennan complained that the courts "approves of brutal censorship." Id.
156. In dictum, Justice White made numerous remarks that local autonomy is vital to the
efficient functioning of the nation's public schools. For example, he stated:
[The Fraser court cited as "especially relevant" a portion of Justice Black's
dissenting opinion in Tinker "disclaiming any purpose... to hold that the Federal
Constitution compels teachers, parents and elected school officials to surrender
control of the American public school system to public school students." Of course,
Justice Black's observations are equally relevant to the instant case.
Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 570 n.4 (ellipses in original) (citations omitted).
157. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text (discussing whether the school news-
paper at issue in Kuhlmeier is a public forum for student expression).
158. See supra notes 124-127 (discussing the degree of deference afforded to local educators
by the court in Kuhlmeier). See also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. , 106
S. Ct. 3159 (1986) (student who gave speech with sexual overtones at school assembly rightly
punished by school officials); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985) (holding that
a warrantless search of a student by a school official was an unreasonable search and seizure
under the Fourth Amendment); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 80-81 (1979) (holding that
the non-hiring of a resident alien by a public school does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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private newspapers. I59 However, the Kuhimeier Court did not hold
that all school-sponsored newspapers are not public forums as a
matter of law. 16° Rather, Kuhimeier establishes a two-prong test to
determine whether censorship of school newspapers violates the first
amendment rights of students. First, students must demonstrate that
the school newspaper is a public forum.' 61 Second, if the paper is
not a public forum, students must show the official's decision to
censor was unreasonable. 62
Given the broad dicta of the Court as to the permissible range of
reasonable justifications for officials to censor school-sponsored stu-
dent expression, 6 and the minimal scrutiny that the rational basis
or reasonable relation test entails,' 64 the second prong of the Kuhl-
meier test may be difficult for future plaintiffs to satisfy. Whether
a school newspaper is a public forum, however, is a factual issue to
be decided on a case-by-case basis. 165 Students must demonstrate that
the school, by policy or practice, intended to create a public forum.16
In Kuhlmeier, the Court found that the school officials did not
clearly intend to create a public forum. 67 The Court emphasized that
the school newspaper was part of a class taught by an adviser who
had substantial control over the newspaper. 168 The Court also con-
cluded that in practice the newspaper was part of the school curric-
ulum and not a public forum, since students received grades and
credits for their work on the newspaper. 69 In addition, the Court
found that the policies of the school board demonstrated that the
159. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("The choice
of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size of
the paper, and content, and the treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair
or unfair-constitutes the exercise of editorial control and judgment.").
160. See supra notes 109-117 and accompanying text (discussing the public forum analysis
in Kuhlmeier).
161. See supra notes 46-63 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of the public
forum). See also supra notes 109-117 (discussing the analysis of the public forum issue in
Kuhlmeier).
162. See supra notes 118-129 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of review
analysis in Kuhlmeier).
163. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text (discussing the degree of discretion
granted to school authorities by the court in Kuhlmeier).
164. See supra note 123.
165. Note, supra note 40, at 633 (discussing the public forum question).
166. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 569 (1988)(citation omitted).
167. Id.
168. See supra notes 114-116 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of fact
regarding the school practice pertaining to the newspaper as a public forum).
169. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (discussing the findings of fact of the
Kuhlmeer court).
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school did not intend to create a public forum. 70 Significantly, the
Court chose to emphasize the school board policy provisions that
indicated that the school newspaper was part of the academic cur-
riculum and that school officials maintained substantial control over
the newspaper.' 7' The Court de-emphasized the more libertarian first
amendment clauses contained in the school board policy 72 by reading
them in light of the provisions which emphasized administrative
oversight and control. By analyzing the school board policies collec-
tively, rather than individually, 73 future courts can more readily find
that school officials do not intend to create a student newspaper that
is a forum for student expression.
In light of the burdens Kuhlmeier imposes on students, state court
may provide a more hospitable forum for the high school press if
the applicable state constitution is more accommodating to the claims
of students than the federal constitution. 74 California courts, for
example, may be more receptive to the claims of students given the
more expansive free speech provisions in the California Constitu-
tion. 175 Indeed, the trend toward filing claims in state courts has
already begun.
7 6
B. Other School-Sponsored Student Expression
The Kuhlmeier Court did not limit its holding exclusively to school
newspapers, but extended its holding to editorial control over all
student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities. 177 In partic-
170. See supra note 114 (discussing the school board policy regarding school-sponsored
newspapers).
171. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 569 (1988).
172. See, e.g., supra note 114 (reiterating the school board policy).
173. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
174. See, e.g., Okamoto, supra note 2 (discussing at length the relative rights of the high
school press under the Federal and California Constitutions).
175. See generally, Id. at 1068-70. The California Constitution provides: "[e]very person
may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible
for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press."
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a). The California courts have concluded that the California Constitution
affords greater protection of free speech and press than does the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 394, 206 Cal. Rptr. 866, 881 (1984); Daily v. Superior
Court, 112 Cal. 94, 97, 44 P. 458, 459 (1896).
176. Court to Student Editors: Teacher Knows Best, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP., Jan. 25,
1988, at 10 (noting that students in Oregon already have decided to bypass the federal courts
and file a suit in state court challenging censorship by a school principal).
177. See supra note 105 (discussing the list of school-sponsored activities given by the
Kuhlmeier court).
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ular, the Court, relying in part on Seyfried v. Walton, 178 a Third
Circuit opinion, referred to theatrical productions as one of the
activities school officials could censor. 179 The reasoning of Seyfried
comports with the logic of Kuhlmeler in that schools may disassociate
themselves from speech that is unsuitable for immature audiences. 18 0
The plight of students participating in censored or cancelled school-
sponsored theatre productions remains an open question.' 8 ' Arguably,
since the Kuhlmeier court was not bound to discuss school theatrical
productions, the mention of theatre productions in the opinion is
dicta. Nevertheless, the repeated reference to theatre productions by
the Kuhlmeier Court indicates that students may have to pass the
two-prong test of Kuhlmeier in future theatrical production cancel-
lation cases.' S2 Because the public forum question is the first prong
of Kuhlmeier, students may successfully sue school officials by show-
ing that school policy or practice demonstrates an intention to make
the school theatre a forum for student expression. 183 The application
of the two-prong test of Kuhlmeier to theatre production cases would
significantly reduce the precedential value of the Seyfried decision
because it is devoid of any discussion of the public forum issue.' 84
178. 668 F.2d 214 (3rd Cir. 1981). Seyfried represents the only reported case on high
school theatre production censorship. The Kuhlmeier Court cited Seyfried for the proposition
that the decision of school authorities to censor school drama productions should be given
substantial deference. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 n.7 (1988).
In Seyfried, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the decision of a school superintendent
to cancel a play production because the play was inappropriate for school sponsorship did not
violate students' first amendment rights. The superintendent cancelled the play because of
emphasis on, and reference to, sexual activities in the play. The play at issue was Pippin.
Pippin is a fantasy about King Charlemagne's son and his search for a full and exciting life.
The musical chronicles his efforts to find himself and the meaning of existence as he experiences
the "glories" of war, the "joys" of the flesh, etc., each of which is ultimately unfulfilling.
Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 216.
179. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569. The court stated that a school may disassociate itself
from student speech as part of its "capacity as... producer of a school play." Id at 571.
180. See supra notes 125-26, 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing the right of school
officials to censor material that involves potentially sensitive topics).
181. See generally Faaborg, High School Play Censorship: Are Students' First Amendment
Rights Violated When Officials Cancel Theatrical Productions? 14 J. L. & EDUC. 575 (1985)
(concluding Seyfried was both superficially and wrongly decided, and also making several
arguments supporting drama students' first amendment rights).
182. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569 (noting that drama productions are school-sponsored
student expressive activities just as high school newspapers are school-sponsored student
expression). Although dicta, the Supreme Court mentioned school drama production four
times in Kuhlmeier. Id. at 569, 570, 571.
183. See supra notes 46-63, 109-117 and accompanying text (discussing the public forum
issue). Notably, the Supreme Court has declared that theatres are public forums designed for
and dedicated to expressive activities for adults. See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (overturning the refusal of a municipality to rent an auditorium for
the production of the play Hair, as an unlawful prior restraint).
184. Faaborg, supra note 181 at 588.
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C. Prior Restraint of Student Happenstance Speech
Almost all of the litigation in the federal courts following the
Tinker decision has not involved school-sponsored activities. Rather,
the activities involved in federal litigation include underground news-
papers, 85 leaflets, 8 6 and various forms of symbolic speech. 187 The
language of the Kuhlmeier majority suggests that the rule in Tinker
will continue to govern non-school-sponsored student expression.
First, the Kuhlmeier Court recognizes a distinction between school-
sponsored speech and the happenstance speech exemplified by Tin-
ker.18 8 Second, the Court indicates that personal views expressed on
school campuses cannot be punished absent a showing of substantial
disruption.18 9 Third, the Court noted that the distinction between
speech that happens to be made on campus and school-sponsored
speech is consistent with precedent. 190 In sum, a substantial amount
of language in Kuhlmeier suggests that application of the Tinker test
to happenstance speech cases will continue.
Nevertheless, Kuhlmeier may affect the conflict that exists in the
federal courts over the proper rule regarding prior restraint of un-
derground newspapers.191 The majority rule, developed by the Fourth
Circuit, treats prior restraint in the public school setting much the
185. See generally, Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1980); Jacobs v. Board
of School Comm'nrs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), dismissed as moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1975);
Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378 (4th Cir. 1975); Baughman v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345
(4th Cir. 1973); Sullivan v. Houston Ind. School Dist., 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973); Fujishima
v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Shanley v. Northeast Ind. School Dist.,
462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971);
Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971), Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10
(7th Cir. 1970); Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1977); Koppell v. Levine,
347 F. Supp. 456 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Poxon v. Board of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 256 (E.D. Cal.
1971); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Baker v. Downey City Board
of Educ., 307 F. Supp. 517 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
186. See, e.g., Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 (Ist Cir. 1971); Hatter v. Los
Angeles City High School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 1309 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
187. See, e.g., Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972); Butts v. Dallas Indep.
School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971); Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970).
188. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier 108 S. Ct. 562, 569 (1988).
189. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567.
190. Id. at 570 n.3. citing Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam)
(holding that a state university student who distributed an underground newspaper containing
indecent material was punished in violation of her first amendment rights).
191. See Note, Constitutional Rights of High School Students, 23 DRAaE L. REv. 403,
406-09 (1974) (discussing students' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as interpreted by
the federal courts after Tinker); Comment, supra note 76 at 405-418 (reviewing the various
positions articulated by the federal circuit courts regarding students' first amendment rights).
418
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same way courts address prior restraint on the adult level.' 92 The
majority rule applies strict scrutiny to school board regulations. 93
School officials must establish stringent procedural safeguards 94 be-
fore prior restraints can overcome the presumption of invalidity. 95
The Seventh Circuit holds that prior restraints on student speech,
including underground newspapers, are per se invalid.'9 In contrast,
the Second Circuit requires very minimal procedural safeguards on
prior restraint programs 97 employing a minimal scrutiny approach. 98
The Kuhimeier Court expressly declined to decide what procedural
safeguards are required in cases involving non-school-sponsored stu-
dent expression. 199 The Court did, however, employ minimum scrutiny
to prior restraint in the context of school-sponsored publications . 2 °
Given the language of the majority emphasizing the necessity of
deferring to local school authorities, 20 ' the majority rule of the Fourth
Circuit regarding prior restraint of happenstance expression would
appear to be disfavored. 20 2 More important, Kuhlmeier suggests that
192. Comment, supra note 76 at 405-411 (discussing the Fourth Circuit rule on prior
restraint of student expression).
193. Id. at 409. See, e.g., Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 383 (4th Cir. 1975) (invalidating
a regulation defining "libel," "obscenity" and "distribution"; providing for a two-pupil-day
review period with written reasons for denying approval; and establishing a three-day appeal
procedure; because the regulation failed to detail the elements of libel and obscenity; did not
provide guidelines for determining what would constitute a substantial disruption of school
activities; and did not establish the appropriate criteria that an administrator might use in
predicting whether a disruption had occurred).
194. See Baughmann v. Freienmuth, 478 F.2d 1345, 1351 (4th Cir. 1973). In Baughmann,
the Fourth Circuit detailed four requirements for any prior restraint program involving student
publications. These criteria required: (1) A clear definition of "distribution"; (2) a provision
for prompt approval/disapproval; (3) a statement informing students of the effect of a failure
to take prompt administative action; and (4) a provision for an adequate and prompt appeal.
Id.
195. Id. at 1348. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text (discussing prior restraint
law in the adult world).
196. See, e.g., Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1358-59 (7th Cir. 1972)
(invalidating a school board rule that prohibited the distribution of any book or publication
on the school premises without the prior approval of the school superintendent); Jacobs v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 1973) (invalidating a school board rule
that required prior approval by the school superintendent before students could distribute
underground newspapers because the school regulation was vague and overbroad).
197. See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1971). In
Eisner, the Court only mandated: (1) a provision for an expedited review procedure; and (2)
a precise definition of the word "distribute." Id.
198. Id at 807.
199. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562, 571 n.6 (1988).
200. Id. at 571.
201. See supra notes 124-127 and accompanying text.
202. To the extent that Kuhlmeier expressly authorizes prior restraint in the student speech
context, Kuhlmeier apparently rejects, at least in part, the Seventh Circuit approach sub silenco.
Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571 (holding of the court). To contrast Kuhlmeier with the Seventh
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 20
a school may not tolerate student expression inconsistent with the
basic educational mission of the school. 20 1 This notion forms the
basis of the right of a school to disassociate itself from certain
student expression.2 4 Therefore, if a school can suppress any student
expression inconsistent with the basic educational mission of the
school, regardless of whether the speech is school-sponsored, affir-
mation of prior restraint in the non-school-sponsored speech realm
could result.
D. The College and University Student Press
The Kuhlmeier Court noted that the decision did not extend to
the first amendment rights of public college and university students.
205
Kuhlmeier, however, may reasonably be interpreted to apply to the
state college and university press. Much of the language in Kuhlmeier
refers to students in public schools generally, without limiting the
language to high schools, junior high schools, and elementary
schools.2 06 In addition, it could be suggested that public colleges and
universities also have a right to disassociate themselves from speech
that is inconsistent with their basic educational mission. Finally, the
factual settings of a high school and state college newspaper may be
similar if students attend a class supervised by an adviser, and
students receive both grades and credit for their work.
20 7
Despite these few arguments, almost all of the language in Kuhl-
meier is supported by cases involving high school students. 20 1 More-
over, the broad discretion granted to school officials in Kuhlmeier
was based in part on the need to protect immature students from
Circuit approach, see, e.g., Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973);
Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
203. Id. at 567.
204. Id.
205. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571 n.7. The court stated: "We need not now decide whether
the same degree of deference [to school authorities] is appropriate with respect to school-
sponsored expressive activities at the college and university level." Id.
206. Id. at 567. For example, the opinion begins, "Students in the public schools.. .
Id.
207. Compare Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 568 (analyzing the facts of Kuhlmeier and
determining that the school newspaper is part of the adopted curriculum of the school) with
Lee v. Board of Regents, 306 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (W.D. Wisc. 1969) (analyzing the factual
setting of a state college newspaper and concluding that the school newspaper is a public
forum for student expression).
208. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 567 quoting Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. , 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3166 (1986) (involving speech given at high school assembly).
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sensitive topics.209 This concern does not exist in a state college or
university setting given the differences in emotional and intellectual
maturity between high school and college students. 210 Finally, courts
have emphasized that the first amendment rights of mature students
are of great social value.211 Imposition of controls upon college and
university student expression would be a very dangerous proposition2 12
and contrary to prior holdings of the Supreme Court. 213 Conse-
quently, Kuhlmeier is not expected to alter public college and uni-
versity students' first amendment rights. 21 4
CONCLUSION
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the U.S. Supreme
court held that public school officials may exercise editorial control
over school-sponsored newspapers when official actions are reason-
ably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. School newspapers
209. Kuhimeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570.
210. See Nicholson v. Board of Educ., Etc., 682 F.2d 858, 863 n.4. (9th Cir. 1982)
("Different considerations govern application of the first amendment on the college campus
and at lower level educational institutions. The activities of high school students, for example,
may be stringently reviewed than the conduct of college students, as the former are 'in a much
more adolescent and immature stage of life and less able to screen fact from propaganda."');
Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: Tinker Distinguished, 59 Geo. L. J. 37,
43-44 (1970) ("Constitutional protection of expression is, of course, always relative to circum-
stances, and it makes sense that greater freedom of provocative expression should be allowed
on a college campus than in a high school."); Trager, Freedom of the Press in College &
High School, 35 Alb. L. Rev. 161, 166-81 (1971) (analyzing the differences between state
college and university students and public secondary school students).
211. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970).
212. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). See also Joyner v. Whiting,
477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
213. See, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(per curiam) (holding that
a state university student who published an underground newspaper was punished in violation
of her first amendment rights); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (holding that a state
university decision to deny students the right to establish a local chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society as a campus organization violated the students' first amendment right of
association). In Healy, the Court made it clear:
the precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because of the
acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections should apply with less
force on college campuses than in the community at large. Quite to the contrary,
"[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools."
Id. at 180 (citation omitted). The court further noted in Popish that "the mere dissemination
of ideas-no matter how offensive to good taste-on a state university campus may not be
shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency."' Papish, 410 U.S. at 670.
214. Seligmann & Namuth, supra note 5 at 60 (concluding that Kuhlmeler will not affect
college and university students, and noting that "at [the college] level, where most of the
students are not minors, the courts have almost always extended full First Amendment
protections.").
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may still be deemed public forums after Kuhlmeier, therefore falling
outside the scope of the holding of Kuhlmeier, although this result
is unlikely.2 15 Early indications are that official efforts to regulate
school newspaper content will increase in the future.
21 6
The Kuhlmeier Court left several issues regarding students' first
amendment rights undecided. The decision may have ramifications
on both school-sponsored student expression, such as theatre prod-
uctions and nonschool-sanctioned student expression involving un-
derground newspapers. The two-prong test in Tinker should continue
to govern cases involving nonschool-sponsored student expression.
The broad discretion given to local public school administrators by
the Supreme Court in Kuhlmeier, however, could result in further
expansion of the school officials' power to limit student speech
uttered on the school grounds.
Scott Leland Hengesbach
215. See infra notes 113-19, 133-36, 171-73 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis
of the public forum issue in Kuhlmeier).
216. Court to Students Editors: Teachers Knows Best, supra note 174 at 10.
